The Syrian state before 2011 collapsed through a planned and well-funded effort led by the United States, Israel, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and others. This alliance pursued a long-term goal to weaken Syria through proxy war, relying on extremist militant groups to destabilise the country from within. These groups, including Al-Qaeda and later ISIS, were actively funded, armed, and logistically supported via networks that included the Gulf states and NATO member Turkey. The Western media maintained a public narrative of democratic uprising, while decision-makers behind closed doors coordinated with extremist elements to fragment Syrian governance.
Well kmown pubicly available evidence confirms this alignment, referenced in a 2012 email from Jake Sullivan to Hillary Clinton stating that “Al-Qaeda is on our side in Syria.” This comment followed the earlier deployment of the same militant networks in Libya. The Free Syrian Army, widely promoted by Western media as a moderate opposition force, served in practice as a logistical middleman, funneling Western-supplied weapons to jihadist factions. The United States and Israel maintained indirect relationships with groups they themselves had legally designated as terrorist organisations, using third-party states such as Turkey and Jordan to manage arms transfers and training operations.
Iran’s involvement came later, and by 2013, the Syrian battlefield had absorbed tens of thousands of foreign fighters, largely drawn from Europe and funneled through Turkey. These recruits were shaped by Salafist indoctrination and sectarian propaganda funded by the Gulf states and transmitted through satellite media channels. Iran, witnessing Syria’s rapid disintegration and the direct threat posed to Hezbollah and itself, moved in alongside Lebanese Hezbollah to support the Syrian government militarily. Until that point, Iranian-Syrian ties had been pragmatic and quite limited. The narrative that Iran was always deeply embedded in Syria is not supported by the historical relationship.
The case of Jolani exemplifies the contradictions in Western policy. A known founding member of ISIS and Al-Qaeda’s designated leader in Syria, he has been progressively rebranded by Western and Israeli partners. His regime has been propped up by political legitimacy efforts, diplomatic shielding, and media softening. U.S. officials have described him in surprisingly favourable terms, while sanctions were lifted on Syrian territories he controls. The West’s toleration of Jolani, despite his head chopping background, followed a pattern of using extremist leaders as short-term instruments. Israel’s recent bombings of his forces, however, indicate that these relationships are transactional and time-limited. Jolani is rumoured to have fled Damascus in the past few days.
Israel’s objectives in Syria remain consistent with its regional doctrine, ensuring the fragmentation and permanent weakening of neighbouring states. Turkey holds and administers parts of northern Syria through military occupation, while also seeking to expand its political and economic influence in the region. Israel prioritises the dismantling of centralised resistance structures and the creation of a buffer zone through balkanisation in part, but the overall agenda is expansionist annexation of lands in fulfillment of the greater Israel plan. The partnership with Jolani was useful until he became a potential consolidator of Syrian territory. When his forces moved into the south and introduced heavier weapons than agreed, Israel launched direct strikes. Whether this action was pre-planned or triggered by weapon transfers is debatable, but the outcome reinforces that Israel will not tolerate any form of power consolidation within Syria, even by a former proxy.
Turkey, under Erdoğan, has played a double role. Snake Erdogan is the ultimate double agent. While publicly posturing as a supporter of Palestinian causes, it maintained robust trade and energy ties with Israel, including direct fuel supply during the Gaza campaign. Ankara allowed its territory to serve as the principal staging ground for militant infiltration into Syria. Turkey also facilitated talks between Jolani and Israeli representatives, reportedly hosting key meetings in Azerbaijan. Erdoğan’s ambitions have been to recreate a Turkish sphere of influence across northern Syria, Iraq, and the Caucasus. He has not allowed Palestine or regional stability to interfere with that goal. Turkey's involvement with NATO remains intact, and its cooperation with Israel has not diminished even during periods of public condemnation.
The broader effect of this multilayered proxy war has been long-term damage to Syrian national cohesion. Sectarianism, once a fringe ideology in the region, has been expanded deliberately through foreign-funded satellite media and religious education networks. This effort created a generational shift in some communities, where extremist Salafist views became embedded, leading to systemic attacks on religious minorities. Crimes committed by groups associated with Jolani, including the use of sex slavery and mass executions, were rooted in this exported ideological extremism.
Despite the earlier unity among the anti-Assad coalition, tensions are emerging. Israel’s recent airstrikes against Syrian areas controlled by former Western-backed groups, including Jolani’s, suggest a recalibration. The United States has downplayed these strikes, calling them misunderstandings, an admission that informal deals between Israel and militant groups existed. But this shift undermines the public narrative that Jolani had become a legitimate political actor. It also complicates future efforts to stabilise the region through such figures.
Among militant networks, morale is reportedly fracturing. Continued Israeli aggression against its former partners is causing internal questioning. Fighters recruited on ideological grounds may not indefinitely tolerate being bombed by the very regimes they were once told were supportive. This creates potential for command breakdowns and defections. Meanwhile, Hezbollah and Iranian influence in the region appears to be growing stronger. Their narrative, that compromise with the West or Israel leads only to betrayal, has gained new traction, especially after Syria’s final collapse and the abandonment of former allies by their sponsors.
In Lebanon and Iran, recent Israeli actions have reinforced calls to maintain resistance structures and arms. Even among previously moderate Sunni or Druze groups, there is now an increased appetite to retain autonomous defence capabilities. The belief that compromise might lead to sanctions relief or reduced pressure has been undermined by Jolani’s own fate.
If Syria’s disintegration continues into formal territorial fragmentation, the Israeli objective of a Balkanised region will be realised. That has long been a strategic priority, and the likely outcome is that Syria will remain a failed state populated by non-state militias, some of which were once aligned with the West and Israel. But with no cohesive structure left and increasing public resentment, the ability to control or influence those groups is diminishing.
This process has also cost Israel diplomatic ground, as its status in the region, already challenged by its Gaza campaign, has taken further reputational damage from direct attacks on former proxies. The broader Arab and Muslim public, as well as some state actors, now see more clearly the expendability of any partner that cooperates with Israel. In Iran, the so-called pragmatist camp has weakened, and resistance factions have gained influence, whilst in Lebanon, Hezbollah’s position has been bolstered, not eroded.
The long-term strategy to collapse Syria has worked, although it has not created a stable post-Assad order aligned with Western or Israeli visions. What is observable instead is a fostered chaos, weakened Western credibility, and increased the appeal of armed resistance. Jolani’s alliance with Israel was never going to be sustainable.
Jolani’s positions in southern Syria have come under repeated Israeli airstrikes. Reports from the area indicate falling morale among his fighters following the attacks. The attempt to consolidate control through cooperation with foreign powers appears to be weakened. In neighbouring states, officials and analysts are focusing on the consequences of this failure rather than any temporary gains made earlier.
The long-term strategy to collapse Syria has certainly worked.
(George Galloway wants Zionism dismantled)
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