Sanctions imposed against Russia by the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom were intended to deliver an economic collapse. Officials believed that cutting Russia off from Western finance, technology, and energy markets would produce immediate structural damage. The goal for the West was economic disruption, political destabilisation and social unrest, with the expectation that the Russian public would reject the government once conditions deteriorated. These expectations have not been met as Russia has demonstrated a level of economic resilience that Western policymakers either underestimated or failed to anticipate. The entire sanctions framework has now exposed the limits of economic coercion as a strategic tool.
( I think Putin redifined this century, it's his !! Image Credit: Rev Laskaris )
The initial Western prediction was that the ruble would collapse, banks would fail, inflation would soar, and the Russian population would protest. As is now well known, none of these developments materialised. Instead the Russian government introduced immediate countermeasures, including capital controls, interest rate hikes, and restrictions on outbound currency flows. These steps restored monetary stability within weeks and over ninety percent of withdrawn bank deposits were returned within two months. The Russian banking system remained operational, whilst the ruble regained its value. Inflation was brought under control as Russia adapted its macroeconomic policy to wartime conditions and kept its economy functioning without foreign support.
Western sanctions focused heavily on restricting Russia’s energy sector. A price cap on oil, combined with efforts to limit revenue from gas exports, formed the basis of the EU’s approach. Additional restrictions were placed on Russian shipping through attempts to block the so-called shadow fleet transporting hydrocarbons outside regulated channels. These measures failed to reduce demand and Oil and gas continue to be purchased globally. The volume of oil and oil products consumed around the world has grown, no decline has materialised. Global energy demand continues to rise, showing no meaningful signs of decline, while Russia’s role as a critical supplier remains unchanged despite ongoing efforts to isolate it. Rather than meaningfully restricting the seller, Western sanctions have primarily raised costs for buyers, further straining already volatile energy markets
Germany and France, both dependent on Russian energy prior to 2022, now import higher quantities of liquefied natural gas at greater cost. Their reliance on alternative energy sources has not solved the underlying supply problem. It has increased expenditure and industrial vulnerability. Sanctions have hurt Western economies while forcing Russia to diversify its customer base. Russian exports to China have doubled since 2021. Exports to India have grown by a factor of ten. New trade corridors and bilateral payment agreements have been established with countries not participating in the sanctions regime, including Turkey, Iran, and others. Russia has replaced Western dependence with a calculated broader geopolitical alignment. The political expectation was that sanctions would isolate the Kremlin internationally, that result has not been achieved. Instead, Russia has accelerated cooperation with China, Iran, and other states pursuing economic independence from Western institutions. Joint strategies now include de-dollarisation, currency swaps, and alternative banking systems. These developments reduce exposure to the U.S. dollar and bypass the SWIFT system. New trade networks are being constructed outside Western control, a realignment without ideological or structural connotations. Countries outside the Western bloc have identified a shared interest in avoiding dependency on politically controlled financial systems.
Sanctions were framed by their architects as morally justified and non-violent, whereas in practice, they function as acts of economic warfare. They are designed to cause suffering, disrupt supply chains, damage currency stability, and undermine civilian living conditions. The Russian population has not reacted by rejecting the government. On the contrary, political support for President Putin remains solid, with over 80% approval rating. Sanctions have been interpreted within Russia as hostile actions and that perception has unified public opinion and reinforced government legitimacy. The strategy failed to account for the resilience of Russian state institutions and the depth of national political cohesion under pressure. Russia’s economic performance has exceeded Western expectations much to their chagrin. Defence spending has increased to six percent of GDP, the highest level in decades. Military production has significantly intensified, with output scaled to meet the expanding operational requirements of the armed forces. Industrial capacity across multiple sectors has been redirected and restructured to prioritise wartime demands over civilian needs. As a result, the country has effectively transitioned into a managed war economy, balancing central coordination with strategic resource allocation. Long-term forecasts still suggest a gradual slowdown, but the current trajectory remains stable. European defence production, in contrast, remains limited. NATO countries are not able to match Russian output. Ukraine is receiving fewer weapons than required. Stockpiles in Western Europe are depleted. New production is constrained by time, cost, and supply chain bottlenecks.
Sanctions have not achieved any of their major objectives. They have not isolated Russia, collapsed its economy, or ended the conflict in Ukraine. Instead, they have forced structural changes in global finance and accelerated the decline of Western financial dominance. The U.S. dollar is still central but no longer unchallenged. The overuse of sanctions as a policy tool has encouraged other states to develop alternatives. Economic coercion has come to symbolise Western frustration and has failed to function as an effective lever of geopolitical success. New sanctions continue to be announced like a broken record. The EU’s 18th package includes further controls on technology transfers and additional listings of individuals and entities. These measures are primarily symbolic as they serve domestic political audiences rather than affect battlefield dynamics or strategic outcomes. Western leaders are now using sanctions to appear active in the absence of viable military or diplomatic solutions. Sanctions have ceased to operate as effective instruments of statecraft and now serve primarily as repetitive political signals lacking strategic impact.
The consequences of current sanction strategies are increasingly evident across systems. Washington and Brussels have significantly overestimated their ability to enforce lasting international compliance. Sanctions have evolved into permanent fixtures within global diplomacy, rather than calibrated responses. They are now detached from defined conditions, strategic benchmarks, or negotiated timelines.
Rather than enabling diplomatic engagement, these measures function as unilateral punitive declarations. This shift undermines their practical utility as instruments of constructive statecraft. Instead of encouraging compromise, sanctions now provoke calculated defiance and policy resistance. Their diminishing effectiveness is directly linked to overuse and strategic repetition. As targeted states diversify trade, finance, and supply routes, evasion becomes routine. Consequently, the global reach of Western financial pressure steadily contracts with time
The failure of sanctions has inadvertently reinforced Russia’s internal economic autonomy. Key strategic sectors have expanded domestic sourcing to reduce foreign dependencies. National supply chains have been restructured to prioritise resilience and continuity. New parallel import systems now bypass traditional channels blocked by sanctions regimes. State institutions have retained functional capacity, enabling continued governance and resource coordination. Civilian infrastructure remains operational, supporting both economic activity and social stability. The economy continues to function under sustained external pressure without systemic breakdown.
Labour markets have absorbed shocks without triggering widespread unemployment or social unrest. Russia’s ability to adapt has preserved internal stability despite prolonged external constraints. In contrast, Western economies are increasingly burdened by energy price volatility, declining industrial competitiveness, and inflation accelerated by their own restrictive policy choices.
Sanctions have simultaneously eroded Western credibility and exposed strategic inconsistencies in policy. Public discourse initially presented these measures as both morally justified and politically effective. In practice, they have achieved neither stated objective in measurable or lasting terms. The West’s support for Israel’s military campaign in Gaza has drawn global scrutiny. This perceived double standard has severely weakened claims to moral leadership on sanctions. Russia has capitalised on this contradiction to argue sanctions reflect power politics, not ethics. That framing positions sanctions as instruments of control rather than principled diplomacy. This narrative has gained traction across regions outside Europe and North America. Many governments in the Global South now view sanctions as selectively applied and self-serving. A broader political realignment is underway, shaped by shifting trust and emerging alternatives.
The historical record strongly reinforces this interpretation of sanctions and their limitations. U.S.-led efforts targeting Cuba, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Venezuela consistently failed to produce meaningful political transformation. In multiple cases, sanctions consolidated elite power while severely harming civilian populations over time. These measures neither forced regime change nor prevented conflict or strategic escalation. They also failed to eliminate the long-term security threats they sought to address. Russia now fits this established pattern, though on a much larger scale. Its economic size, structural depth, and strategic alliances enhance its resilience to sanctions. Unlike smaller states, Russia can absorb external pressure without systemic collapse or capitulation. This capacity challenges the core assumption that economic isolation ensures political compliance. It underscores the diminishing utility of sanctions as a tool of coercive diplomacy.
Western analysts fundamentally misjudged the structural character of the Russian state. They failed to anticipate the cohesive national response triggered by external pressure. Key assumptions included the belief that political loyalty would dissolve under hardship. Analysts presumed that global financial systems were indispensable and irreplaceable for Russia. They expected that sanctions would constrain resources and thereby shorten the war. Each of these assumptions has proven incorrect when tested against unfolding events. Rather than retreat, Russia has maintained momentum on the battlefield and expanded territorial control. The war has persisted longer than anticipated, with Moscow adapting its strategy decisively and now battle hardened forces that the West cannot match. Meanwhile, the international economic system has begun shifting toward multipolar resilience structures. The cumulative effect has been a visible weakening of the Western position.
There is no coherent strategy guiding what comes after initial sanctions deployment. Sanctions remain in effect without clear objectives, benchmarks, or diplomatic end states. Meanwhile, European economies face mounting strain from energy volatility and reduced industrial output. Strategic reserves, including fuel, munitions, and critical raw materials, have been significantly depleted. Global influence, once centralised in Western institutions, is now increasingly fragmented and contested. Russia has deepened its economic integration with Asian markets and regional financial systems. China, in turn, has expanded its influence by aligning with alternative trade blocs. The United States has undermined its own financial dominance by overusing economic coercion. Despite these setbacks, Western political leaders continue to speak as if sanctions succeed. Yet available metrics and on-the-ground realities point decisively to policy failure.
The primary remaining function of sanctions is performance, there is no applicable strategic purpose left.
They provide the appearance of action, optics as they like to say, in contexts defined by policy stagnation.
Sanctions generate headlines and political posturing but fail to produce concrete solutions. Rather than facilitating resolution, they contribute to the prolongation of ongoing conflicts. Instead of unifying international actors, they often deepen geopolitical divisions and distrust. Sanctions now embody a world order that is no longer actively maintained through effective enforcement, yet continues to be rhetorically upheld by declining powers seeking to preserve their influence.
The sanctions strategy has been a total failure, Russia is not Zimbabwe. Russia remains functional, sovereign, and aligned with powerful global partners. Western credibility has eroded significantly, creating space for emerging global alternatives. Financial coercion may influence the future international order, but its trajectory will be determined more significantly by resilience, strategic autonomy, and structural shifts. Western policymakers have underestimated the long-term consequences of their own unilateral decisions. Those consequences have now set irreversible processes into motion across multiple regions.
While the sanctions imposed on Russia have failed to produce the intended outcomes, the political situation inside Ukraine has deteriorated under the weight of internal dysfunction and external abandonment. President Zelensky, once presented in the Western media as a democratic figurehead, is now facing increasing pressure from both domestic opposition and his former foreign sponsors. The image of principled wartime leadership has been replaced by growing reports of power consolidation, financial corruption, and elite defection. The prevailing narrative has shifted from portraying Kyiv as a functioning democracy under siege to recognising it as a capital paralysed by institutional collapse and political gridlock. Zelensky’s ascent to power resulted neither from a populist surge nor from a nationally coordinated reform movement. His 2019 election campaign was backed by powerful oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky, who financed his television shows, supplied legal infrastructure, and controlled the national media network that broadcast his messaging. The television programme “Servant of the People,” in which Zelensky played a teacher who accidentally becomes president, provided the brand and name for his political party. This branding strategy succeeded in reframing Zelensky as an outsider and anti-corruption reformer, although he was already part of Ukraine’s media-political establishment before entering formal politics.
( Is This The Off-Ramp They Needed? )
Once in office, Zelensky installed personal associates in senior state positions, including longtime collaborators from his entertainment company Kvartal 95. His chief of staff, Andriy Yermak, had worked alongside him as a producer and became the most powerful unelected figure in the administration. Rather than dismantling Ukraine’s pre-existing system of elite patronage, the president replaced the old power networks with a new one centred on personal loyalty. This centralisation of control extended into judicial appointments, media regulation, and parliamentary coordination, undermining any remaining institutional checks on presidential authority. The war effort further accelerated this process of centralisation, as Zelensky suspended opposition parties, banned unfriendly media outlets, and consolidated emergency powers under the pretext of national security. Western leaders and media platforms defended these moves as temporary wartime necessities, but the political structure that has since emerged is neither temporary nor limited in scope. The presidency now operates with limited domestic oversight and reduced tolerance for internal dissent. These changes has not translated into battlefield victories, instead they have created an administration that no longer resembles the democratic model initially advertised.
The most visible breakdown of governance has emerged through the collapse of Ukraine’s anti-corruption oversight bodies. NABU and SAPO, the two primary agencies responsible for monitoring defence procurement and foreign aid allocation, were both either dismantled or placed under the direct control of the presidential administration. These institutions were originally established with U.S. and European funding after 2014, intended to act as compliance mechanisms to ensure that Western assistance was not diverted or embezzled. By eliminating their operational independence, the president removed a critical layer of accountability, triggering both public protests and private diplomatic warnings from foreign missions in Kyiv.
(Sudden widespread co-ordinated attacks on Zelenksy)
Protests in Kyiv, although not large in scale, are politically significant due to their composition and timing. Demonstrators are drawn mainly from urban NGO circles, civil society activists, and Western-funded governance programmes. These do not appear to be grassroots mass demonstrations from the working class or military families, but rather a mobilisation of the foreign-aligned Ukrainian middle class that once supported the post-Maidan political framework. Reports indicate that U.S. and UK embassies privately warned the Ukrainian government not to suppress the protests by force, signalling that confidence in the president is declining rapidly among former supporters. Looking at the protests, I was surprised Zelensky’s goons from the conscription and forced recruitment centres were not busy kidnapping men at these protests for the frontlines.
On the same day that these oversight agencies were neutralised, the newly appointed Defence Minister formally requested $120 billion in additional military and operational funding from Western donors. Observers interpreted the timing as a pressure tactic directed at international partners: either provide unconditional financial assistance or accept reduced oversight over how those funds are spent. Zelensky’s team has effectively linked the continued existence of transparency mechanisms to the flow of foreign money. The message is straightforward, without guaranteed funding, there is no justification for continued foreign interference in budgetary decisions. This shift has provoked open criticism from Western media platforms that previously supported the Ukrainian leadership without qualification. Outlets such as The Times, The Spectator, The Economist, and others have now begun publishing critical coverage of Zelensky’s domestic political management, especially his consolidation of power and undermining of accountability structures. The portrayal of Zelensky as a democratic reformer has been quietly abandoned. In its place, a new image has emerged of an increasingly isolated leader presiding over a fragmented state, deteriorating battlefield positions, and a hollowed-out administrative system.
(A wave of negative Western media coverage signals that Zelensky’s tenure may be nearing its end)
The internal power struggle is not limited to political rivals or liberal NGOs. The most dangerous threat to the president may come from the far-right military factions that gained influence during the early phase of the war. Battalions aligned with nationalist ideologies, such as Azov and Svoboda, retain combat roles and political leverage. These groups oppose any settlement with Russia, reject autonomy arrangements for the Donbass region, and remain hostile to the original terms of the Minsk agreements. Zelensky is now constrained by the very forces that once served as the backbone of his defence narrative. Any attempt to negotiate peace risks provoking open insubordination or even a coup attempt from within Ukraine’s own security structure.
On the battlefield, the Ukrainian position continues to deteriorate. Russia has made steady advances in the east, including around Kharkov and in the strategic city of Pokrovsk, which is now close to encirclement. Ukrainian forces are stretched thin, equipment is in short supply, and NATO member states have admitted that their stockpiles are insufficient to maintain support at current levels. Russia is producing drones, missiles, and artillery shells at a pace several times greater than what Western states can provide. Military parity is no longer viable under these conditions, and the Ukrainian command structure is being forced into retreat positions.
Diplomatic negotiations have collapsed entirely. The most recent talks held in Istanbul lasted only thirty-five minutes before the Ukrainian delegation withdrew. Russian negotiators described the meeting as unproductive, citing the absence of realistic proposals from the Ukrainian side. With the battlefield shifting, and Kyiv politically paralysed, Russia has little incentive to compromise. Ukraine has nothing to offer that would meaningfully change the trajectory of the conflict. The only ongoing communication between the two sides now involves prisoner exchanges and logistical coordination for returning the dead.
Inside Kyiv, the political consensus that held together the wartime administration has broken apart. Elites are repositioning for the collapse of the current government. Some are preparing for exile, while others are consolidating resources to survive a transition. Foreign embassies are quietly reassessing who they can support in a post-Zelensky environment. The presidency has lost its legitimacy in the eyes of many of its former international backers, and the narrative of Ukraine as a democratic frontline state is no longer being sustained in official briefings or public commentary.
What began as a war over territory has now become a crisis of governance, state integrity, and elite survival. The Western governments that built up Zelensky’s profile now face the consequences of their decision to invest in a political structure that lacked institutional resilience. No credible successor has emerged within the existing political hierarchy, and no clear roadmap for an orderly transition of power has been articulated. The political architecture of post-Maidan Ukraine is collapsing under the weight of its contradictions, and the consequences for Europe’s strategic position are still unfolding.
The dismantling of Ukraine’s anti-corruption framework was a deliberate act of wartime governance, aimed specifically at removing the final internal checks on executive authority. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) were not symbolic institutions. They were key instruments created by Western donors after the Maidan protests to monitor the distribution of public funds and prevent the misuse of international assistance. Their operational independence was guaranteed by binding agreements with the European Union and the United States. Their closure, or political neutralisation, represents a deliberate break from the governance model established after 2014.
The justification provided by the administration was that wartime circumstances required unified command and the removal of procedural obstructions. This argument does not withstand scrutiny as the agencies targeted were not obstructing military operations. They were investigating large-scale fraud in defence procurement and foreign aid distribution. Documents obtained from internal sources showed that planned investigations into contracts for food supplies, fuel purchases, and logistics chains were progressing rapidly. These investigations included foreign-registered companies acting as intermediaries and domestic networks controlled by figures with direct access to the presidential office.
The government’s response was immediate, marked by rapid and coordinated legal action. Amendments were swiftly passed to bring both NABU and SAPO under direct executive control. Senior staff members were either removed from their positions or strategically reassigned. Sensitive databases and active case files were sealed or discreetly transferred elsewhere. International donors were excluded from consultation and not notified in advance. The official reaction from Brussels and Washington remained muted but internally critical. Several diplomatic missions reportedly issued private warnings to Kyiv regarding future aid. These communications indicated that continued funding required restored oversight and institutional integrity. Despite these warnings, Ukrainian leaders made no public admission of the situation. They continued requesting financial support while ignoring the visible collapse of oversight.
The removal of oversight has triggered a new wave of protest, led not by opposition politicians or military veterans, but by civil society organisations with strong ties to Western funding structures. These groups include policy institutes, anti-corruption monitoring foundations, and legal advocacy groups originally established during the post-Maidan transition. Their organisers and spokespeople have received direct grants from USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy, the European Endowment for Democracy, and affiliated arms of the U.S. State Department. Their actions are not in the traditional sense independent as they reflect a political current shaped by external donor priorities and democratic governance frameworks developed outside Ukraine. Protesters have demanded the reinstatement of oversight institutions and the immediate publication of government procurement data. They have also called for greater transparency in negotiations with the IMF and World Bank. The demands reflect the conditions attached to Ukraine’s financial support agreements since 2015. What is notable is that these demands are now being made in public, by groups that once operated through quiet coordination with government ministries. The decision to protest rather than lobby reflects the loss of informal channels and the hardening of presidential control.
Embassy personnel stationed in Kyiv are reportedly divided over the unfolding situation. Some officials now believe that President Zelensky’s position has become politically unsustainable and are quietly preparing for a potential leadership transition. Others contend that removing or weakening the presidency at this stage would critically undermine the broader war effort and national stability. Among Western diplomatic staff, there is currently no unified position or consensus.
What is increasingly evident, however, is that confidence in Zelensky’s capacity to implement internal reforms has significantly diminished. He is no longer viewed as a dependable steward of Western financial aid or a credible enforcer of anti-corruption initiatives. The prevailing diplomatic posture has shifted perceptibly, from one of strategic partnership to one of cautious containment.
Reports from the U.S. Treasury Department and the State Department confirm that new financial monitoring mechanisms are being prepared outside Ukrainian jurisdiction. These include third-party audits, conditional disbursement structures, and forensic tracking of military assistance. The aim is to bypass compromised domestic agencies and ensure that aid flows are verifiable at source and destination. This structure effectively removes financial sovereignty from the Ukrainian government, placing aid under external custodianship. This is not cooperation. It is control.
Zelensky’s reaction to these developments has been defensive and erratic. He has accused unnamed groups of undermining the war effort and serving foreign agendas. His statements are designed to delegitimise protest without directly confronting donors, but the strategy has failed. Western officials no longer accept the argument that internal reform must be postponed indefinitely, that war narrative is no longer sufficient to override governance failure. Corruption is no longer viewed as an unfortunate cost of wartime resistance; it is now regarded as a strategic liability that undermines both governance and international support.
The president’s relationship with the nationalist battalions remains another source of political instability. These groups oppose Western pressure to restore oversight institutions, viewing the NGOs and foreign advisers as threats to national sovereignty. They have accused anti-corruption activists of sabotaging the war from within and have called for increased surveillance of civil society groups. Zelensky is caught between conflicting power centres, one dependent on Western financial legitimacy, the other reliant on radical nationalist mobilisation. Trying to maintain the support of both is no longer possible.
Military commanders have voiced frustration with political paralysis and growing interference from unaccountable civilian networks. Leaked communications suggest that field units are now operating with reduced logistical coordination and inconsistent support from central command. Such failures reflect the degradation of the administrative structure that managed Ukraine’s wartime governance. Central authority is being replaced by informal networks and parallel systems of control.
Zelensky has lost the trust of both his original sponsors and his internal security base. Zelensky’s administration has ceased to function as a unified state apparatus.
It now operates as a fragmented system defined by competing agendas, factional dependencies, and personal loyalty networks rather than institutional coherence.
The dismantling of Ukraine’s anti-corruption infrastructure was not a reactive misstep; it was the logical outcome of a political model that prioritised narrative control over institutional credibility. This trajectory has led directly to the systemic breakdown of governance and oversight.
Western involvement in Ukraine extended far beyond military assistance, encompassing political advising, civil society engineering, and the design of institutional frameworks intended to align Ukraine with democratic norms.
That comprehensive investment has now unraveled under the weight of institutional collapse and strategic mismanagement. The breakdown of oversight mechanisms is not a marginal policy failure, it represents the dismantling of the very framework that legitimised sustained Western engagement. In the absence of accountability, claims to democratic legitimacy lose their foundation and credibility. Without legitimacy, there is no defensible political model for the international community to support or protect. Continued financial and political backing becomes untenable when a partner state abandons the rules it previously committed to uphold.
The protests do not reflect a revival of democratic mobilisation but instead serve as an emergency signal issued by the final remnants of Ukraine’s institutional framework.
The state has ceased to function as a coherent political entity, with an overstretched military, a presidency facing a legitimacy crisis, and foreign partners increasingly exploring disengagement strategies. What was once framed as a military conflict has now evolved into a full-scale political breakdown. What was once a potential risk of institutional collapse has now materialized into the prevailing reality. What remains is a fragile state marked by financial dependency, strategic incoherence, and the systematic erosion of the post-Maidan reforms once used to justify the war effort.
For the West, Zelensky has proven a costly investment. Ukraine has drained billions, weakened Europe’s global influence, and is contributing significantly to its strategic decline.
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