Iran Faces An Attritional War
The deeper issue for Washington is strategic exhaustion. Its global presence now depends more on coercion and less on partnership.
(China's HQ-9B air defence system)
Iran has begun receiving surface-to-air missile systems from China in exchange for oil, following Israeli attacks that damaged its defence infrastructure. This development comes as Tehran seeks to quickly rebuild its air defence capability after suffering direct strikes from Israeli aircraft. The scale of damage during the 12-day conflict and the vulnerabilities exposed have forced Iran to prioritise missile defence over other high-tech weapon systems it cannot realistically acquire in sufficient numbers.
The shift in Iran’s procurement strategy reflects a practical assessment. There is no prospect of receiving large numbers of Russian or Chinese fighter jets that could challenge Israeli or US air superiority. Iran cannot match US or Israeli air power in numbers, training, or battlefield coordination. It does, however, possess thousands of ballistic missiles. What it lacked, and is now addressing, is reliable defence for those missile launch systems. Protecting these missile launch assets is critical, as Iranian missiles caused enough damage in Israeli cities to pressure Tel Aviv into agreeing to a ceasefire.
China’s willingness to supply air defence systems appears confirmed by its statement expressing openness to arming friendly states. While not an explicit confirmation, this diplomatic phrasing is common when states want to signal intent without declaring it outright. Iran and China already have a long-standing relationship. This arms deal extends that partnership into a deeper military cooperation, especially since installation, maintenance, and operator training will tie Iranian forces to Chinese military systems for years.
(Chinese radar system)
The timing of these shipments follows the BRICS summit, where Russia also signalled support for Iran’s civilian nuclear program. Russia’s ability to provide air defence systems is limited by its war in Ukraine, where its own inventory and manufacturing capacity are stretched. China, on the other hand, faces no such bottleneck. Western reports of Chinese overcapacity mean these systems can be supplied quickly and in volume, without disrupting domestic demand.
Missile production capacity is becoming a critical metric. The US cannot produce enough Patriot interceptors to meet needs in Ukraine alone, let alone additional demands from Israel or a future war with Iran. Current production is capped at roughly 600 missiles per year. At least two Patriot missiles are required to intercept one Russian Iskander missile. Russia produces over 800 Iskanders annually. Israel’s expenditure during the 12-day war alone depleted an entire year’s worth of US-supplied interceptors. Each interceptor costs over $12 million. Combined with the billion-dollar price tag for the full system, this level of supply is unsustainable.
China holds another key advantage, control over rare earth elements needed in missile systems, jet fighters, and other advanced military equipment. US-made systems, especially the F-35, rely heavily on magnets and alloys produced only in China. Following US-led restrictions on semiconductor exports, China imposed its own export controls on rare earths and rare earth magnets. The US has no significant domestic production and is now forced to apply for licences for supply.
The US military-industrial base, already weakened by decades of outsourcing, cannot match Chinese industrial scale. Washington’s model is built around profit rather than long-term strategic planning. Without a direct demand signal and guaranteed returns, private industry is unwilling to scale up production for extended war. Internal reports admit as much. The lack of coherent planning and structural weakness in production explains the supply gap the US now faces.
Iran, aware of these limitations, is aligning more closely with China and Russia. BRICS membership has given Tehran a wider diplomatic base, but weapons sales now deepen those ties. Unlike US arms deals, Chinese exports do not come with restrictions. Once sold, the buyer can use them freely. So on top of the military support, Iran gets long-term strategic alignment through maintenance, training, and shared operational experience.
The use of proxies remains part of US policy. Groups like HTS, formerly listed as al-Qaeda affiliates, are being delisted to allow open arming against Iranian interests. This follows earlier patterns in Syria, where US-backed factions fought Iran-aligned forces. On the ground, Iran is unlikely to face US invasion, but the threat of proxy war persists.
Washington’s broader strategy of regime change remains unchanged. The stated reason, concerns over nuclear weapons, is not credible when Iran's civil programme is being rebuilt with Russian assistance. The goal remains to contain or subordinate Tehran. The same objective applies to China and Russia, and we can see that the conflict is not regional, as each front is connected.
What Iran faces is attritional war, as the US cannot win quick wars anymore. It no longer has the stockpiles, nor the industrial base to fight extended campaigns. Its entire military doctrine, built around rapid strikes and decapitation, cannot sustain operations once drawn out. Iran is preparing for that reality, and is seeking the means to survive repeated strikes and keep retaliatory pressure on Israel and US assets in the region. An outright win is not possible.
This rearmament is meant to ensure safety and stability, and is about preservation. Iran knows it cannot match the US or Israel in open warfare. But if it can maintain credible retaliatory capability, it can deter future full-scale attacks. That is what the current deals with China aim to secure. The cost of war is now increasing for Washington and Tel Aviv, and neither has the domestic political space to absorb those costs over time.
The deeper issue for Washington is strategic exhaustion. Its global presence now depends more on coercion and less on partnership. Countries are aligning with China not out of ideology, but doing so because Beijing offers development without dictation. The US, by contrast, combines its military presence with threats, economic pressure, and regime manipulation. This is why even nations with interest in US relations hedge their bets.
Iran has faced decades of pressure and remains standing. Its current strategy is shaped by the understanding that no policy shift from Washington is coming. Rearmament doesn't per se signal an intention of escalation, Iran expects the conflict to continue indefinitely, and intends to survive it. As such, we cannot define that as an ideological position. This strong nation, this old civilization is in survival mode.
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Too bad Iran didn't just finish the job. Hopefully these AD systems have the range to counter stand-off fire.