A Rebuttal to the West’s Misreading of Russian Sovereignty

How Western Policy Misjudges Russian Security Concerns and Historical Memory

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(Vladir Putin and James Nixey)

James Nixey’s recent statements (His full statement is at the bottom of this article) reflect long-standing misconceptions embedded in Western policy circles. The repeated insistence that Russia must be “de-imperialised” and “de-putinised” reflects more a strategic objective than a neutral assessment. He is not proposing reform but advocating externally driven political replacement. His position mirrors the larger Anglo-American foreign policy tradition of seeking to dismantle rather than understand sovereign states that resist integration into a Western-led global framework.

Russian leadership has consistently maintained that its political trajectory must be determined by internal processes. President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated that Russia will not accept external engineering of its political system. In his 2021 Valdai Discussion Club speech, Putin said, “We are not interfering in others’ affairs. But we will not allow anyone to interfere in ours.” That position reflects past events involving collapse, conflict, and foreign interference. The 1990s liberalisation experiment, conducted under Western sponsorship, led to economic contraction, demographic crisis, and political disintegration. That chapter shaped contemporary Russian scepticism towards foreign prescriptions.

The West’s characterisation of Russia as an “imperial” power ignores the basic structure of the Russian Federation. Russia is a multi-ethnic, constitutionally federal state. Its regional republics, such as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Chechnya, hold political representation and cultural autonomy unmatched in several Western states with colonial legacies. The United Kingdom does not grant proportional political power to its former imperial subjects. The United States maintains territories without voting rights. Western analysts rarely apply their language of “imperialism” inward.

The assumption that Russia’s international posture represents revisionism ignores stated policy goals. Russia does not seek domination over others, but insists on multipolarity in global governance. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has said repeatedly, “Russia is not against rules, but against rules invented by a few behind closed doors.” Russia opposes the so-called “rules-based international order” not because it rejects order, but because those rules are often selectively applied. NATO’s 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia was not sanctioned by the United Nations. The invasion of Iraq in 2003, built on falsified intelligence, demonstrated how rules shift to accommodate Western strategic goals.

Since 2007, when Putin addressed the Munich Security Conference, Russian officials have warned that unilateralism in global affairs would create instability. The speech described anticipated risks in future internationaldevelopments. He stated, “We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law.” His warning was completely ignored and since then, NATO expanded to Russia’s borders. The European Union supported political movements in post-Soviet states that aligned with its interests, often without consideration for ethnic divisions, security risks, or economic consequences. Western governments described these operations as efforts to support democracy. Libya has remained unstable since the 2011 intervention and regime change. Afghanistan ended with a complete NATO withdrawal and Taliban government restoration. Syria has been regime changed, now led by western backed terrorists and remains divided between multiple armed factions and foreign military presences.

The Western political class now presents Russia’s domestic and foreign policy choices as evidence of dangerous ambition. The demand that Russians must repudiate their history or leadership in order to be welcomed into the “civilised world” is inconsistent with how the West treats its own past. British officials still defend the moral basis of empire. The United States celebrates its expansionist era as Manifest Destiny. France has not dismantled the symbols of its colonial period, holding many African nations hostage to perpetual looting. No one asks these nations to sever historical continuity.

The argument that Russia poses an ideological threat to democracy is not supported by Russia’s stated doctrine. Moscow does not export political models nor does it fund foreign parties that advocate Russian-style governance. Russia’s influence efforts abroad are aimed at securing favourable diplomatic alignments, not regime imposition. Western countries, by contrast, have institutionalised regime-change mechanisms through civil society funding, media support, and covert operations. These efforts were admitted by former U.S. officials such as Victoria Nuland during the Ukraine crisis. Russian policy is defensive, shaped by encirclement, sanctions, and perceived betrayal of post-Cold War promises.

The idea that only exiled Russians who denounce their country deserve a platform is a political filtering device, not a moral standard. Russian figures who support sovereignty, multi-polarity, or traditional values are excluded from mainstream Western discourse regardless of their credentials or arguments. This creates a closed loop of confirmation bias. Analysts such as Fyodor Lukyanov, Dmitri Trenin, and Sergey Karaganov, though independent in outlook, are rarely cited in Western policy debates, though their insights are widely respected within Russia and parts of Asia.

The characterisation of Russian resilience as aggression misrepresents Moscow’s position. Russia has not claimed new territory outside post-Soviet borders since 2008. Its involvement in conflicts such as Syria occurred at the invitation of the recognised government. The West’s military actions often bypass this legal formality. The occupation of parts of Syria by U.S. forces has no United Nations mandate. The presence of French troops in parts of Africa continues under fragile legal justifications. Russia's actions are not isolated from context, but that context is usually excluded in Western presentations.

Domestic support for Russia’s current course remains high despite sanctions, isolation, and conflict. Western analysts attribute this to propaganda, ignoring that national unity in times of perceived external threat is a common pattern in state behaviour. We saw in the same pattern in Iran when the West failed to trigger a regime change during the 12 day war. Polling data from independent Russian sources such as the Levada Center, though Western-funded, consistently show broad support for sovereignty, stability, and resistance to outside control. That support is not uniform, but it is substantial and grounded in lived experience, not media influence alone.

The goal of “breaking” Russia into a manageable state has existed in Western strategic thought since the Cold War. They succeeded with the Africans via The Berlin Conference of 1884. Zbigniew Brzezinski argued in favour of breaking Russia into three regions to prevent its return as a global power. More recently, analysts in NATO-affiliated think tanks have floated ideas about decentralising the Russian Federation. These proposals are rarely described as hostile but are framed as democratic restructuring. The impact of such ideas, if acted upon, would lead to political disintegration, regional chaos, and nuclear insecurity on a scale not seen in modern history.

Russia’s policy elite understands these risks. Dmitry Medvedev, former president and current Security Council deputy, has warned that any attempt to fragment Russia would result in a strategic catastrophe. He said in 2023, “The collapse of a nuclear power would lead to unpredictable global consequences.” These warnings are dismissed in the West as bluster, yet no serious strategist denies that the stability of the Russian Federation remains vital to global security.

Western nations now face the question of how to engage a country that will not submit to engineered change. Russia’s system has flaws, but reform must come from within because National renewal cannot be outsourced. Attempts to force a transformation through pressure, shame campaigns, and diplomatic isolation are unlikely to succeed and could lead to wider instability. No country responds to humiliation with concession.

A durable security order in Europe and beyond cannot be built on double standards, exclusion, or demands for ideological surrender. Russian citizens, regardless of political alignment, share an interest in sovereignty, security, and historical continuity. That reality will remain regardless of who governs. Those designing policy from afar would do well to study how past interventions have failed. The work of building a stable international system will require understanding, not just instruction.

Authored By:

Global GeoPolitics

BELOW IS THE ARTICLE REBUTTED

James Nixey Reflecting Western Opinion on Dismembering Russia

analyst, former director of the Russia and Eurasia program at Chatham House (UK)

“In my opinion, the Russia we would like to see is a de-imperialized, deputinized, de-Sovietized, even de-Stalinized Russia, which it never was”

I am known as a Russia hawk. I don’t really like this term, but I think it is accurate. After all, the alternative to being a Russia hawk these days is, you know, not to criticize Russia’s genocidal determination to address root causes or something like that. I mean, everybody has to be a Russia hawk or a Russia realist, if you will, and be realistic about Russia, its nature, its intentions, its ambitions and its appetites.

And I have to say that I don’t have much faith, based on my experience, in the diplomatic initiatives, the latest ones that we see in the press and in general. The Kremlin has made it absolutely clear that it is not interested in diplomatic initiatives, and that is what our collective assessment of Russia’s intentions should be. I am sure this applies to everyone in this room. But, of course, this analysis tends to blur the further you go to the west. And, frankly, I don’t want to make excuses for the Russian people.

This war may not be popular. People may still want Vladimir Putin to go away, to leave office. But polls in Russia also show quite clearly that now that they are in this war, they can win it. The majority of Russians still want to win the war, to take Ukraine for themselves.

In other words, in 2025, the majority of the Russian population believes that Russia should be an empire, and that Ukraine – among others, but not only Ukraine – is smaller and deserves some form of subjugation. And, frankly, I know personally many Russian analysts who want Putin to go.

They want democracy in Russia. But they also want a compromise, a division of Ukraine. They still want at least Crimea. They still believe that NATO is aggressively expanding and is the culprit and is actually the root cause of all this. So, frankly, knowing all this and having my personal experience with Russia for more than 30 years, I will be honest with you: I have a hard time trusting the Russians. Do you understand? I just don’t. It’s hard for me to trust Russians. And I’m not even Ukrainian. I don’t even have family ties to Ukraine. I have no skin in the game, as they say.

So why am I even here?

Well, if I thought that any of these Russians believed in such things, I certainly wouldn’t be here. If I thought that they believed that Russia should have colonies, that Ukrainians are inferior, that there should be some kind of compromise solution, and that Russia should not lose the war. If I thought they believed that, I wouldn’t be here. But I don’t think it’s true about the Russians here today and on the screen. And if you accept that as the truth and think about it, they are just like you and me, whether we are British or Ukrainian or whatever.

So, I think that the Russians in this room are the best representatives of Russia. Of course, they are a minority, and absolutely disenfranchised. But they at least have the qualities that I think you Ukrainians have: courage, intuition, honesty. And one more thing that maybe you don’t have, but the Russians do, and I probably shouldn’t speak for them, but I would say that they also have shame. Shame for what their country has done and is doing.

So, when changes come to Russia (and I would not like to set a time frame, but I believe that they will come), these are the kind of Russians you will want to cooperate with. So, I also have to say that Russians are a key piece of the puzzle when it comes to analyzing Russia. And I believe that it is necessary to analyze Russia endlessly. Just as we talk about rebuilding Ukraine and strengthening Ukrainian society even before the war is over. And you have seen this, for example, in Rome over the last few weeks, we can, or at least should, also talk about what we would like to see Russia like when Ukraine is safe and territorially integral again, as it should be.

In my opinion, it should be a de-imperialized, de-putinized, de-Sovietized, even de-Stalinized Russia, which it never was. And again, I hope that the views on this in this room and on the screen will not differ too much. Yes, we may disagree on the size, shape and appearance of the new Russia. I myself am philosophical about whether post-war Russia should retain its current shape and size, its status in the UN… Probably not. But I believe that this does not matter. I think these are urgent topics for discussion.

And I think we can do it. So, as I mentioned earlier, I just want to say that Ukraine is being raped by Russia. And I can hardly imagine what Ukrainians are going through. I don’t think I can imagine it, even though I have a lot of Ukrainian friends. I can understand why Ukrainians don’t trust Russians. So, these things need to be approached carefully, delicately, patiently. And I think that would be the limit of my hopes and ambitions for today.

James Nixey,

analyst, former director of the Russia and Eurasia program at Chatham House (UK)